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JEFFREY S. LUBBERS*
NANCY G. MILLER**
PREFACE
In the Summer 1991 issue of the Administrative Law Journal of The
American University, Tracy Corell Hauser published The Administra-
tive Procedure Act, Procedural Rule Exception to the Notice and
Comment Requirement- A Survey of Cases.' Hauser's useful survey
sought to clarify the current confusion that exists in defining a proce-
dural rule for the purposes of the APA's exemptions from rulemaking
requirements. In her analysis of the case law, she concludes that the
"substantial impact" test is still the operative test, and that this test is
"a viable means to distinguish substantive from procedural rules."' She
also concludes that "[a] new test, however, is in the making."'
Our analysis and purpose differ significantly from Hauser's. We pro-
pose an alternative to the various existing tests that courts have applied
in determining whether a particular rule should be exempt from notice-
and-comment requirements because it is a rule of procedure or process.
We prepared this article in connection with the Administrative Confer-
ence of the United States' consideration of this issue.4 However, the
views expressed in this article are the authors' and do not necessarily
represent the views of the Administrative Conference or its members.
INTRODUCTION
Section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 5 contains
* Research Director, Administrative Conference of the United States, B.A., Cor-
nell University 1971, J.D., University of Chicago 1974.
** Senior Attorney, Administrative Conference of the United States, B.A., Univer-
sity of California, San Diego 1975, J.D., University of California, Berkeley 1978.
1. Tracy Corell Hauser, Survey, The Administrative Procedure Act, Procedural
Rule Exception to the Notice and Comment Requirement-A Survey of Cases, 5 AD-
MIN. L.J. AM. U. 519, 552 (1991).
2. Id. at 552.
3. Id. at 553.
4. The text of ACUS Recommendation 92-1, approved by the Conference in June
1992, 57 Fed. Reg. 30,102 (July 8, 1992) (to be codified at 1 C.F.R. § 305.92-1), is
reproduced in the Appendix.
5. Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Pub. L. No. 74-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946)
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the procedural requirements for notice-and-comment rulemaking. It re-
quires that an agency publish notice and provide opportunity for public
comment before adopting a rule.6 It also provides for several specific
exceptions to these requirements. For example, the requirements for
notice and comment do not apply "to interpretative rules, general state-
ments of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or prac-
tice." 7 An even broader exception is provided for "a matter relating to
agency management or personnel."8
The scope of APA exceptions concerning notice-and-comment rules
has been described as "enshrouded in considerable smog," 9 and the
term "procedural rule" has no clear definition."0 This issue is currently
in a state of flux, due in part to the decision of the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit in Air Transport Association v. De-
partment of Transportation." In that case, the court held that rules
establishing the procedures for adjudicatory hearings under the Federal
Aviation Administration's (FAA) Administrative Civil Penalty Pro-
gram were not exempt as procedural rules from the APA's notice-and-
comment requirements. Stating that the procedural rule exception ap-
plied to "housekeeping rules" and was reserved' for rules organizing an
agency's "internal operations,' '1 2 the court held that the FAA regula-
tions "encoded a substantive value judgment" by "substantially af-
fect[ing] a civil penalty defendant's right to an administrative adjudi-
cation."'" Abjuring the distinction between "procedure" and
"substance," the court distinguished instead between "rules affecting..
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
6. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1988).
7. Id. § 553(b)(A).
8. Id. § 553(a)(2). This provision exempts such rules not only from notice-and-
comment requirements, but from all of § 553, including its requirement to publish a
statement of basis and purpose.
9. Noel v. Chapman, 508 F.2d 1023, 1030 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 824
(1975); see also Community Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 946 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
10. The term "procedural rule" as used here and by most courts that have consid-
ered the subject, refers generally to "rules of agency organization, procedure or prac-
tice." 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (1988). See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281
(1979); American Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Batterton v.
Marshall, 648 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
11. 900 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1990), judgment vacated and remanded, - U.S. -'
111 S. Ct. 944 (1991). The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals
for a determination on the question of mootness. The Court of Appeals vacated the
opinion and dismissed the petition for review as moot. 933 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
12. Air Transp. Ass'n v. Department of Transp., 900 F.2d at 376 (citing Chrysler
Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 310 (1979)).
13. Id. (quoting American Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1047 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (emphasis in original)) .
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* 'the rights or interests of regulated' parties, . . . and [rules affecting]
agencies' 'internal operations'. 14 A strong dissent criticized the major-
ity's "abandon[ment]" of the "procedural/substantive" dichotomy, and
proposed a test of whether the rule regulates "primary conduct. '"' The
Supreme Court accepted the government's petition for certiorari in the
case, but subsequently vacated the lower court's decision and remanded
it for consideration of the issue of mootness.16 Thus, the question re-
mains unsettled. 7
The Administrative Conference has already addressed the scope of
most of the other major exceptions to the APA rulemaking require-
ments.18 Because the procedural rule exception is increasingly contro-
versial, it is an appropriate time for the Conference to consider filling
this gap in its recommendations.
I. THE APA REQUIREMENTS
As noted above, section 553(b)(A) exempts from notice-and-com-
ment requirements "rules of agency organization, procedure or prac-
14. Id.
15. Id. at 378 (quoting American Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d at 1041, 1047).
16. Id. at 382 (Silberman, J., dissenting).
17. Although the opinion was vacated and the case dismissed on mootness grounds,
the D.C. Circuit's decision on the merits may continue to have precedential weight.
See, e.g., Action Alliance of Senior Citizens v. Sullivan, 930 F.2d 77, 83 (D.C. Cir.
1991) (stating that decisions, vacated on other grounds, continue to have precedential
weight on other issues in absence of contrary authority); Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse,
920 F.2d 967, 975 & n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (stating that Supreme Court's vacating of
court of appeals' decision on one issue does not affect precedential value of issues not
raised on appeal); Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 870 F.2d 1292, 1298
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 81 (1989) (stating that "although
vacated, the [cited] decision stands as the most comprehensive source of guidance
available on the . . . questions at issue in this case"); Espinoza v. Fairman, 813 F.2d
117 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1010, 107 S. Ct. 3240 (1987) (explaining that
decision vacated by Supreme Court remains persuasive precedent so long as Court did
not reject its underlying reasoning).
In fact, Air Transport has been cited, albeit in dicta, in cases considering the need
for notice and comment for rules of procedure. Moore v. Madigan, No. 91-0029-CV-
W-2, slip op. at 10 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 30, 1992).
18. See ELIMINATION OF CERTAIN EXEMPTIONS FROM THE APA RULEMAKING RE-
QUIREMENTS, ACUS RECOMMENDATION No. 69-8, 1 C.F.R. § 305.69-8 (1992) (detail-
ing § 553(a)(2) rules pertaining to "public property, loans, grants, benefits, or con-
tracts"); ELIMINATION OF THE "MILITARY OR FOREIGN AFFAIRS FUNCTION"
EXEMPTION FROM APA RULEMAKING REQUIREMENTS, ACUS RECOMMENDATION No.
73-5, 1 C.F.R. § 305.73-5 (1992) (detailing § 553(a)(1)); INTERPRETIVE RULES OF
GENERAL APPLICABILITY AND STATEMENTS OF GENERAL POLICY, ACUS RECOMMEN-
DATION No. 76-5, 1 C.F.R. § 305.76-5 (1992) (detailing § 553(b)(A)); THE "GOOD
CAUSE" EXEMPTION FROM APA RULEMAKING REQUIREMENTS, ACUS RECOMMENDA-
TION No. 83-2, 1 C.F.R. § 305.83-2 (1992) (detailing § 553(b)(B), where agencies find
that notice and comment are "impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public
interest").
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tice."' 19 The statute does not define those terms explicitly. A separate
subsection of section 553 does, however, exempt rules involving "mat-
ters of agency management or personnel" from all of section 553's re-
quirements." Because agency "housekeeping rules" seem to fall within
the latter, broader exemption for rules involving agency management,
it does not seem consistent with either logic or grammar to limit the
procedural rule exemption to "housekeeping rules."
Furthermore, the Attorney General's Manual on the APA, a docu-
ment whose importance in understanding the APA has long been rec-
ognized, treats "rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice'.'
as coextensive with the rules required to be published, stating: "[T]he
rules of organization and procedure which an agency must publish pur-
suant to [APA] section [552](a)(1) and (2) are not ordinarily subject
to the requirements of [APA] section [553](a) and (b)." '21 At the time
it was enacted, section 552(a) applied to:
(1) descriptions of [an agency's] central and field organization including delega-
tions by the agency of final authority and the established places at which, and
methods whereby, the public may secure information or make submittals or re-
quests; and, (2) statements of the general course and method by which its func-
tions are channeled and determined, including the nature and requirements of
all formal or informal procedures available as well as forms and instructions as
the scope and contents of all papers, reports, or examinations. 22
Thus, as originally enacted and interpreted, the APA's procedural
rule exemption appears to cover a much broader range of rules than
only "housekeeping" rules. Procedural rules of the type at issue in Air
Transport, i.e., rules governing formal adjudicatory procedures, would
seem to fit within this statutory exemption.
II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS
There are relatively few significant cases on the scope of the proce-
dural rule exemption, and those cases are inconsistent. The problem in
this area, as in other areas of law, is that the distinction between proce-
dure and substance is not always clear. Most courts recognize the diffi-
19. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (1988).
20. Id. § 553(a)(2).
21. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 5, 30, (1947) reprinted in ACUS FEDERAL ADMINIS-
TRATIVE PROCEDURE SOURCEBOOK (2d ed. 1992) [hereinafter ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
MANUAL]. Sections 553(a) and (b) contain the requirements for notice and opportunity
for public comment in informal rulemaking.
22. Id. (emphasis added). Section 552 has since been amended. The original provi-
sion in § 3 of the APA (now § 552) is, however, instructive in determining the original
intention.
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culty of this analysis, and some courts, such as the D.C. Circuit in Air
Transport, have substituted other (and to us, nonstatutory) tests.
Courts employ various methods to analyze the issue, and they are sum-
marized below.
A. "Procedural means procedural"
One approach to whether a particular rule comes within the "proce-
dural rule" exemption depends simply upon whether it addresses some
sort of agency procedure. The Ninth Circuit adopted this approach in
Southern California Edison Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission,2" when it reviewed Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) rules establishing procedures for approving certain types of
rates. The court rejected the argument that the rules should be subject
to notice-and-comment requirements because they had a "substantive
effect." Instead, the court held that the exemption extended to "techni-
cal regulation of the form of agency action and proceedings." 4 Because
the regulations "pertain[ed] to the procedural aspects of FERC's ap-
proval of . . . rates: intervention, requests for refunds for interim rates
and for final confirmation and approval," 25 the court found that they
fell within the APA exemption.
B. "Substantial impact"
Other courts, recognizing that substance can sometimes wear a pro-
cedural face and that rules appearing to be procedural can affect sub-
stantive rights, have developed a "substantial impact" standard for de-
termining whether a rule should be exempt from the notice-and-
comment requirements. This test, which appears to have first surfaced
in National Motor Freight Ass'n v. United States,2" subjects a rule
otherwise covered by one of the APA exemptions to notice-and-com-
ment procedures if it has a "substantial impact" on the regulated com-
munity or their rights and interests.27 The focus of this test is on the
23. 770 F.2d 779 (9th Cir. 1985).
24. Id. at 783 (quoting Pickus v. United States Bd. of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107, 1113
(D.C. Cir. 1974)).
25. Id.
26. 268 F. Supp. 90 (D.D.C. 1967) (three-judge panel), affid mer., 393 U.S. 18
(1968) (holding Interstate Commerce Commission promulgation of informal proce-
dures for restoration of past changes to shippers invalid because procedures were not
exempted from APA's notice-and-comment requirements).
27. See generally Brown Express, Inc. v. United States, 607 F.2d 6905 (5th Cir.
1979) (holding ICC elimination of notification practice not exempt due to its substan-
tial impact). Cf. Department of Labor v. Kast Metals Corp., 744 F.2d 1145 (5th Cir.
1984). Hauser describes Kast Metals as applying the "substantial impact" test.
1992]
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magnitude of a rule's impact, not on the nature of that impact. Where
a procedural rule's impact reaches a certain undefined level, it is sub-
ject to notice and comment prior to promulgation.28 Although several
courts have used the "substantial impact" test, it is no longer the sole
criterion for determining whether notice and comment should be re-
quired.29 It has not, however, been completely abandoned.3"
C. "Encoding a substantive value judgment"
Perhaps recognizing that a test based totally on magnitude of impact
is inadequate to determine whether a rule is a "procedural rule," sev-
eral D.C. Circuit cases have used a test that focuses on whether the
particular rule "encodes a substantive value judgment."13' This test
originated in American Hospital Ass'n v. Bowen.3' The court noted
that exceptions to the notice-and-comment requirements are narrow,
and should be limited to reflect the requirements' purposes. Those pur-
poses are "to reintroduce public participation and fairness to affected
parties after governmental authority has been delegated to unrepresent-
ative agencies" and to "assure that the agency will have before it the
facts and information relevant to a particular administrative problem,
as well as suggestions for alternative solutions."' 31 In the context of the
procedural rule exception, the court noted the shift away from the
"substantial impact" test toward a determination of whether "the
agency action also encodes a substantive value judgment or puts a
Hauser, supra note 1, at 532. Although the court does use the language of substantial
impact, its analysis focuses not on the magnitude of the impact, but rather on whether
the type of impact (effect of OSHA's inspection priorities) is one against which the
plaintiff was entitled to protection. Department of Labor v. Kast Metals Corp., 744
F.2d at 1153.
28. The test has also been applied in the context of interpretive rules, e.g., Pickus v.
United States Bd. of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (holding that Board of
Parole rules, which concerned eligibility requirements for parole, were not exempt from
notice-and-comment requirements of APA).
29. American Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (ex-
plaining that over time, test for determination of exemption for procedural rules in §
553 of APA has "gradually shifted focus from asking whether a given procedure has a
'substantial impact' on parties ... to inquiring more broadly whether the agency action
also encodes a substantive value judgment . . .on a given type of behavior").
30. Air Transp. Ass'n v. Department of Transp., 900 F.2d 369, 376 (D.C. Cir.
1990) (noting that FAA rules of practice "substantially affect a civil penalty defend-
ant's right to an administrative adjudication").
31. We view this as a separate test. Hauser, on the other hand, views it as "merely
the substantial impact test with a new name." Hauser, supra note 1, at 544.
32. 834 F.2d 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
33. Id. at 1044 (quoting Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
and Guardian Fed. Say. & Loan Corp. v. FSLIC, 589 F.2d 658, 662 (D.C. Cir.
1978)).
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stamp of approval or disapproval on a given type of behavior. 3 4
In American Hospital, the court deemed "procedural" a number of
agency directives and transmittals relating to the operation of the
Medicare program's peer review organization (PRO) program."6 These
documents contained a "wide variety of instructions, guidelines and
procedures covering aspects of the PRO program." 6 Many of the
guidelines related to enforcement strategy, and contained fairly specific
standards for what kind of hospital activity would result in PRO re-
view.37 The court did not explain how the "encodes a substantive value
judgment" test actually should be applied, but rather simply concluded
that new substantive burdens would not result from the rules.38
Shortly thereafter, the D.C. Circuit applied the American Hospital
"encoding" test, but with a different result, in Reeder v. FCC.39 This
case involved FCC procedures concerning radio station requests for
channel upgrades. The court held that amended procedures, which re-
lated to the timing of applications, had the effect of changing the sub-
stantive criteria for substituting, and thereby upgrading, channel allot-
ments assigned to license holders.4 Because the "procedures" were
determined to have a substantive effect, the court insisted on notice and
comment.
Air Transport is perhaps the most recent "encoding" case." This
case involved the FAA's rules of practice for the formal adjudications
of administrative civil penalties in cases involving violations of air
safety regulations. The rules addressed such matters as discovery, brief-
ing, and evidentiary issues. While the content of some of the rules was
fairly controversial, they were clearly a set of practice rules relating to
the enforcement proceedings themselves. The rules did not address the
substance of air safety regulations that were being enforced through
civil penalties.
Nonetheless, the court eschewed any attempt to distinguish whether
the rules were "procedural" or "substantive," opting instead for what it
termed a "functional analysis." '42 The court's primary ground for hold-
ing that the rules at issue fell outside of the exemption was that "they
34. Id. at 1047. The court gave no citation for the origin of this test.
35. Id. at 1050-52.
36. Id. at 1043.
37. American Hosp., 834 F.2d at 1049, 1051. The court noted that agency enforce-
ment plans warrant considerable deference. Id. at 1050.
38. Id. at 1052.
39. 865 F.2d 1298 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
40. Id. at 1305.
41. Air Transp. Ass'n v. Department of Transp., 900 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
42. Id. at 376.
1992]
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substantially affect a civil penalty defendant's right to an administra-
tive adjudication."'43 The court held that the FAA, in drafting these
rules of practice, made choices concerning what process civil penalty
defendants were due. "Each one of these choices 'encode[d] a substan-
tive value judgment' ... on the appropriate balance between a defend-
ant's rights to adjudicatory procedures and the agency's interest in effi-
cient prosecution.""' The court stated that in using the terms "rules of
agency organization, procedure or practice, . . . [Congress] intended to
distinguish not between rules affecting different classes of
rights-'substantive' and 'procedural'-but rather to distinguish be-
tween rules affecting different subject matters-'the rights or interests
of regulated' parties, . . .and agencies' 'internal operations.'- 5
D. "Regulating primary conduct"
The dissent in Air Transport strongly disagreed with the appropri-
ateness of eliminating the procedure/substance distinction. While rec-
ognizing its difficulty of application, the dissent noted that it was Con-
gress that had established the distinction, and that Congress did not
say that rules become less procedural simply because they are
significant."'
The dissent proposed the following distinction as consistent with the
APA: "If a given regulation purports to direct, control, or condition the
behavior of those institutions or individuals subject to regulation by the
authorizing statute, it is not procedural, it is substantive. 4 7 Recogniz-
ing that agency rules must fall somewhere on a continuum from proce-
dural to substantive, the dissent took the view that the FAA's rules of
43. Id. (emphasis in original). The court cited as its authority for this rationale its
earlier opinion in National Motor Freight Traffic Ass'n v. United States, 268 F. Supp.
90 (D.D.C. 1967). The court cited this case for the proposition that a rule affecting the
right to avail oneself of an administrative adjudication is not within the express terms
of § 553(b)(A). However, National Motor Freight involved a situation where the
agency created a reparations scheme without any statutory authorization. Moreover,
the language quoted by the Air Transport majority was not part of the holding in
National Motor Freight; it was simply an observation that a shipper's right to avail
itself of the reparation proceeding was not trivial "simply because it is optional." Na-
tional Motor Traffic, 268 F. Supp. at 96.
In the Air Transport case, there was express statutory authority for administrative
adjudication.
44. 900 F.2d at 376 (emphasis in original).
45. Id. at 378. The court also held that the FAA could not rely on the "good
cause" exemption because (1) a statutory deadline does not automatically confer good
cause, and (2) the agency's "own delay" in taking action undercut its invocation of that
exemption. Id. at 379.
46. Id. at 381.
47. Id. at 382.
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practice, "which deal with enforcement or adjudication of claims of vi-
olations of the substantive norm but do not purport to affect the sub-
stantive norm[,] . . .are . . .clearly procedural. 4
III. DEVELOPING A WORKABLE TEST
While most generally agree that a line needs to be drawn between
what is covered by the exemption and what is not, the cases discussed
above demonstrate the difficulty in drawing such a line.
Ultimately, the "procedure is procedure" test is unhelpful because
substance can be masked as procedure. Therefore, an agency's label
may be unreliable."' On the other hand, when a rule deals with the
processes an agency uses or intends the public to use in its rulemaking
or adjudications, it has been generally considered procedural for the
purposes of the APA exemption (until the Air Transport case).
The "encodes a substantive value judgment" test is also problematic.
Courts have either not engaged in useful analysis or they have used the
test in a way that could effectively eliminate the statutory distinction
between procedural and substantive rules. In Reeder v. FCC, the court
applied the test without substantial discussion, although the result was
probably correct because the assertedly procedural rule modified the
substantive regulatory program. In contrast, the D.C. Circuit in Air
Transport applied the test by looking at how the rule balanced interests
in procedural due process, rather than whether the procedural rule af-
fected the substance of the behavior the agency is charged with enforc-
ing in civil penalty proceedings (i.e., aviation safety).50 Under such an
application, no agency rules of practice would likely qualify as exempt
because all procedures that in any way involve the public's interaction
with an agency necessarily involve a balance between agency interests
and those of the public. 51 Moreover, the court's rejection of the proce-
dure/substance dichotomy in favor of a "functional analysis" clearly
48. Id. (emphasis in original).
49. See General Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 1561, 1565 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (relying on EPA label of "interpretive rule"), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1074
(1985); Chamber of Commerce v. OSHA, 636 F.2d 464, 468 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (ex-
plaining that agency's label is not dispositive).
50. It seems unlikely that the procedures that would apply in an adjudicatory hear-
ing on civil money penalties would have much impact on industry compliance with air
safety regulations.
51. Cf Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (stating that agency interests
must be balanced with private interests and risk of erroneous decisions in procedural
due process cases). As Judge Silberman's dissent in Air Transport put it, "It will be
impossible for any agency general counsel, in the future, safely to advise agency heads
that a given set of proposed rules are procedural." 900 F.2d at 381.
1992]
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undercuts the APA's statutory distinction between "rules of procedure"
and "substantive rules."52
The "substantial impact" test is similarly flawed. It focuses not on
the nature of a rule's impact, but solely on the magnitude of that im-
pact. Such a distinction ignores the congressional intent to treat proce-
dural rules differently from substantive rules.53 A rule does not become
less procedural merely because it affects a large number of people.
Moreover, the test ultimately provides little guidance. Because the
"substantiality" of a rule's impact can often be judged only in retro-
spect, this would require prudent agencies to put rules out for notice
and comment even where it should not be required.
The "primary conduct" test proposed by the Air Transport dissent is
an improvement on the tests that currently exist.54 It looks at "primary
conduct," namely, the type of underlying activity that is subject to the
agency's regulation. To the extent that an agency's "procedural rule"
meaningfully affects such behavior, it is-regardless of its la-
bel-"substantive," and therefore should be subject to notice-and-com-
ment requirements (unless it falls within the scope of another exemp-
tion). A similar test would apply in the context of government
programs,5 5 where regulation is often directed not at conduct or behav-
ior, but at eligibility. If the procedure meaningfully affects the stan-
dards for eligibility, it would likewise cease to be "procedural" and be-
come "substantive.15 6 Although this test does not always provide an
52. Although the term "substantive rule" does appear in 5 U.S.C. § 553(d) (1988),
the clearest distinction appears in the publication section (now § 552(a)(1)(C) and
(D), formerly § 3(a) of the original APA). The ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra
note 21, at 22, reprinted in ACUS FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
SOURCEBOOK (2d ed.) at 88, also makes great use of the term "substantive rules."
53. See the ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL which explains that the notice-and-
comment rulemaking procedures (originally found in §§ 4(a) and 4(b) of APA) are
"applicable only to substantive rules" and not to "rules of organization and procedure."
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 21, at 30, reprinted in ACUS FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE SOURCEBOOK (2d ed.) at 96.
54. Hauser also looks favorably on the test proposed by Judge Silberman. "The
'primary conduct' test proposed in the Air Transport dissent is an attempt to update
the antiquated 'substantial impact' test." Hauser, supra note 1, at 553.
55. The term "program" as used here is intended to be interpreted broadly, to in-
clude, among other things, those involving benefits, grants, contracts, permits, licenses,
and loan guarantees. Rules relating to grants and benefits are exempt from notice and
comment, 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (1988). However, the Conference has recommended
eliminating this exemption, "ACUS Recommendation" 69-8, supra note 18. In addi-
tion, many agencies have voluntarily waived their use of it. See 24 C.F.R. § 10.1
(1990) (Dep't Housing and Urban Development); 29 C.F.R. § 2.7 (1990) (Dep't of
Labor).
56. See Fugere v. Derwinski, 119 DAILY WASH. L. REP. 289 (Feb. 11, 1991)
(C.V.A. 1990) (holding departmental manual provision affecting eligibility for disabil-
ity benefits to be substantive); Air Transp. Ass'n v. Department of Transp., 900 F.2d at
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absolutely clear result, it creates a somewhat brighter line, and has the
advantage of emphasizing whether the rule has a substantive effect
rather than a substantial effect, thus placing the focus on the nature of
the impact and retaining the distinction between procedure and
substance.
It is important to remember that, while a procedural rule may be
issued without notice and comment, this does not preclude challenges
to the rule's contents. The provisions of such a rule must be consistent
with the applicable statute, APA requirements, and the Due Process
Clause of the Constitution." The rule must also not be arbitrary, capri-
cious, or an abuse of discretion. 8 Moreover, someone interested in
placing their views before the agency on a procedural rule may file a
petition for rulemaking requesting a change in the rule at any time.6 9
We therefore recommend that the Conference urge agencies (and re-
viewing courts) to employ the following standards when deciding
whether rules are procedural and, thus, legally exempt from notice-
and-comment requirements: a rule is procedural and, thus, exempt
from notice and comment only if (a) the rule relates to agency proce-
dures (either methods of internal operations or agency methods of in-
teracting with the public), and (b) the rule does not meaningfully af-
fect (i) conduct, activity, or a substantive interest that is the subject of
agency regulation, or (ii) the standards for eligibility for government
programs.60
382-83 (Silberman, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that rules altering benefits eligibility
are substantive). Cf Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 702-03, 707-08 (D.C. Cir.
1980). Some agencies, with court approval, have invoked the procedural rule exemption
for enforcement manuals issued for the purposes of setting out the agency's policies in
prosecuting enforcement actions. See American Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 854 F.2d 1037
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (reviewing Medicare enforcement guidelines); Department of Labor
v. Kast Metals Corp., 744 F.2d 1145 (5th Cir. 1984) (reviewing OSHA inspection
targeting plan). While enforcement manuals can be analyzed as to whether they are or
are not "procedural" as suggested by this article, it is likely that the more salient claim
would be that such manuals fall within the exemption for "interpretative rules [or]
general statements of policy.".See Brock v. Cathedral Bluffs Shale Oil Co., 796 F.2d
533 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Scalia, J.) (holding that OSHA inspectors' guidelines are policy
statement).
57. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B)-(D) (1988).
58. Id. § 706(2)(A).
59. Id. § 553(e) (requiring agencies to allow persons to petition for amendment of
rules). See also PETITIONs FOR RULEMAKING, ACUS RECOMMENDATION No. 86-6, 1
C.F.R. § 305.86-6 (1992); William V. Luneberg, Petitions for Rulemaking, Federal
Agency Practice and Recommendations for Improvement, 1986 ACUS RECOMMENDA-
TIONS & REPORTS 493, reprinted in revised form, William V. Luneberg, Petitioning
Federal Agencies for Rulemaking: An Overview of Administrative and Judicial Prac-
tice and Some Recommendations for Improvement, 1988 WIs. L. REV. 1.
60. In ACUS RECOMMENDATION 92-1, the Administrative Conference has chosen
to use the term "significantly" rather than "meaningfully." See 3 (Appendix). The
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This proposed recommendation would interpret the procedural rule
exemption to place certain types of rules, such as rules governing con-
duct of formal adjudication or ex parte rules, outside the mandatory
notice-and-comment requirements. This does not mean that agencies
should be discouraged from voluntarily using such procedures in their
promulgation. The Conference is on record as generally favoring the
use of notice and comment because of its recognized advantages,61 in-
cluding (1) providing the agency with valuable input from the public,
including information about the impacts of the rule and other informa-
tion the agency may not have at its disposal; and (2) providing en-
hanced legitimacy and public acceptance of rules that comes from hav-
ing public participation in the process.
The Conference should therefore recommend that agencies volunta-
rily provide an opportunity for notice and comment with respect to cer-
tain types of procedural rules. When considering promulgating proce-
dural rules, agencies should weigh the benefits of notice and comment
against the costs. This proposal recognizes that there can be substantial
costs associated with notice-and-comment rulemaking. Although the
section 553 procedures are not onerous, there is a cost (of approxi-
mately $400 per page) for Federal Register publication. Notice-and-
comment procedures also expend additional agency time and energy.
The benefits of notice and comment, however, can be substantial. Par-
ticularly where the rules at issue involve procedures to be used in new
administrative adjudication programs or major modifications of existing
procedures, providing notice and comment will offer the advantages
mentioned above. Where minor or technical changes to rules of prac-
tice are involved, notice-and-comment rulemaking would be unneces-
sary. The most difficult question, of course, arises where rules are mi-
nor to some and more significant to others. In those situations agencies
should err on the side of openness and should provide an opportunity
for advance comment unless they are convinced that the cost-benefit
ratio is disproportionate. In fact, agencies have reported that they gen-
erally do provide opportunity for notice and comment for rules of pro-
cedure or practice.62
authors prefer "meaningfully," which they believe focuses more on the qualitative
rather than the quantitative aspects of the impact. However, "significantly" is an ac-
ceptable substitute. The authors recognize that the precise meaning of both words is
difficult to articulate.
61. See generally ACUS RECOMMENDATION No. 69-8, supra note 18.
62. We have had the opportunity to review agency responses to an American Bar
Association questionnaire on the extent to which agencies use notice-and-comment pro-
cedures in promulgating rules of procedure and practice (copies on file with Adminis-
trative Conference). We have also reviewed comments from agency general counsels on
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Adding a proposal stage to agency rulemaking might also produce
additional review by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).
Executive Order 12,291,63 which established the authority and frame-
work for OMB review of agency rulemaking, includes rules "describing
the procedure or practice requirements of an agency" among those that
are subject to review. 4 The Executive Order also provides that agency
rules be submitted to and receive clearance by OMB at both the pro-
posed and final stages. Clearly, such review can be time-consuming.
Agencies may be discouraged from voluntarily using notice and com-
ment because its use could produce additional delays at the review
stage.
Because it would be counterproductive to discourage the use of no-
tice-and-comment rulemaking in the case of procedural rules, the Con-
ference should recommend that OMB refrain from reviewing proposed
rules fitting the definition of procedural rules, where an agency has vol-
untarily chosen to use the notice-and-comment process."5
CONCLUSION
Considerable smog obscures the current state of the law as to which
rules may be deemed exempt from the APA's notice-and-comment re-
quirements as a rule of practice or procedure. Accordingly, we suggest
that agencies, and reviewing courts, adopt a test that focuses on how
the rule affects the underlying conduct that the agency is charged with
regulating. We also recommend that agencies use notice-and-comment
procedures on proposed regulations that might fall within the exemp-
tion where the benefits from public input outweigh the costs.
the Conference's proposed recommendations. The responses indicate that most agencies
generally do use notice and comment for such rules, although not for rules of agency
organization. This may explain why there are relatively few cases addressing the appli-
cability of the APA exemption. The responses to the questionnaire also indicate, how-
ever, that agencies do wish to retain their discretion to use the statutory exemption in
appropriate situations.
63. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982).
64. The Executive Order does exempt from its coverage rules "related to agency
organization, management, or personnel." Id. OMB officials have acknowledged in con-
versations with the authors that the Executive Order, by its terms, covers procedural
rules exempt from notice and comment, but they also stated that OMB generally re-
frains from exercising its review over rules that are solely procedural in scope.
65. Although the subject is beyond the. scope of this article, we would, for similar
reasons, suggest that OMB should also refrain from reviewing proposed rules falling
within other exemptions where the agency has voluntarily used notice-and-comment
procedures. The Administrative Conference has frequently urged agencies to volunta-
rily eschew the invocation of rulemaking exemptions. See ACUS RECOMMENDATIONS,
supra note 18.
1992]
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JOURNAL
APPENDIX
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES COMMITTEE
ON RULEMAKING RECOMMENDATION 92-1, 1 C.F.R. § 305.92-1
THE PROCEDURAL AND PRACTICE RULE EXEMPTION
FROM THE APA NOTICE-AND-COMMENT RULEMAKING
REQUIREMENTS
The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553, establishes the
procedural requirements for notice-and-comment rulemaking. It re-
quires that an agency generally publish notice and provide opportunity
for public comment before adopting a rule. The section also provides
for a number of specific exemptions. One of these exemptions, in sub-
section (b)(A), provides that the requirements for notice and comment
do not apply to "rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice."1
The scope of APA exceptions has been described as "enshrouded in
considerable smog," 2 and the question of what is a procedural or prac-
tice rule has no clear answer.3 The issue is in a state of flux.4 Although
courts have used a number of different tests to determine whether a
rule was one of procedure or practice, none has been particularly satis-
factory. Over the years the Conference has addressed the scope of most
of the other exceptions to the APA rulemaking requirements. 5 Because
the procedural rule exception is a subject of increasing controversy, it is
appropriate for the Conference to fill this gap.
The Conference has long advocated the value of notice and comment
in rulemaking,6 and this recommendation encourages agencies to use
1. The term procedural rule will be used herein to refer to rules of agency practice
and procedure. Other exemptions from notice-and-comment rulemaking. requirements
cover interpretive rules, policy statements, and situations where good cause exists. See
§ 553(b). Section 553(a) completely exempts from notice-and-comment rulemaking
rules involving military or foreign affairs, agency management or personnel, grants,
loans, benefits, or contracts.
2. Noel v. Chapman, 508 F.2d 1023, 1030 (2d Cir. 1975); see also Community
Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
3. There has been less debate about what are rules of agency organization.
4. Air Trans. Ass'n v. Department of Transp., 900 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1990),
judgment vacated and remanded, 111 S. Ct. 944 (1991), opinion vacated and petition
dismissed on mootness grounds, 933 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1991), has recently focused
attention on the scope of the exemption.
5. Recommendation 69-8, "Elimination of Certain Exemptions from the APA
Rulemaking Requirements, I C.F.R. § 305.69-8 (1992); Recommendation 73-5,
"Elimination of the 'Military or Foreign Affairs Function' Exemption From APA
Rulemaking Requirements," I C.F.R. § 305.73-5 (1992); Recommendation 76-5, "In-
terpretive Rules of General Applicability and Statements of General Policy," I C.F.R.
§ 305.76-5 (1992); Recommendation 83-2, "The 'Good Cause' Exemption from APA
Rulemaking Requirements," 1 C.F.R. § 305.83-2 (1992).
6. See Recommendation 69-8, supra note 5.
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such processes voluntarily in promulgating rules of procedure or prac-
tice. Notice and comment can provide the agency with valuable input
from the public as well as furnish enhanced public acceptance of the
rules. On the other hand, there can be costs to the agency in using
notice-and-comment procedures, including the time and effort of
agency personnel, the cost of Federal Register publication, and the ad-
ditional delay in implementation that results from seeking public com-
ments and responding to them. For significant procedural rule changes,
the benefits seem likely to outweigh the costs; but this may not be the
case for minor procedural amendments. Thus, unless the costs outweigh
the benefits, we strongly encourage agencies voluntarily to use notice
and comment even where an APA exemption applies.
The Conference believes, however, that the procedural and practice
rule exemption can in appropriate circumstances serve a legitimate gov-
ernmental purpose, and that Congress intended it to be available in
such cases. Where such rules are truly procedural, rather than substan-
tive in a procedural mask, the statutory exemption should be available.
The Conference therefore recommends, as a guide to agencies in deter-
mining when a rule is procedural, that agencies should establish first
that the rule relates to an agency's internal operations7 or methods of
interacting with the public and second that the rule has no substantive
impact because it neither significantly affects conduct, activity or a
substantive interest that is the subject of agency regulation, nor affects
the standards for eligibility for government programs.8 Only if the pro-
posed rule meets both parts of this test, should it be considered as being
within the exemption from notice-and-comment requirements as a rule
of practice or procedure. Examples of rules that would be procedural
under this standard include rules governing conduct of formal hearings
or appeals, ex parte rules, and rules concerning the business hours of
the agency. Examples of nonexempt rules include rules relating to the
criteria for determining the severity of enforcement sanctions, levels of
civil money penalties, or application requirements that serve to limit
eligibility for a government benefit program.
In order to encourage agencies voluntarily to use notice and com-
7. It is likely that some rules relating to agency internal operations will also fall
within a category of rules exempt from all of § 553's requirements (including publica-
tion of a statement of basis and purpose and delayed effective date) as a "matter relat-
ing to agency management or personnel." 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2)(1988).
8. The term "program" is meant to be interpreted broadly to include, among
others, those involving benefits, contracts, licenses, permits, and loan guarantees. In this
connection, it should be noted that many agencies, following Recommendation 69-8,
have voluntarily waived the exemption from notice-and-comment rulemaking for mat-
ters relating to loans, grants, benefits, or contracts.
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ment, the Conference also recommends that the Office of Management
and Budget refrain from exercising its jurisdiction to review rules fit-
ting within the definition of rules relating to an agency's procedure or
practice when an agency voluntarily publishes them.
RECOMMENDATION
1. Federal agencies should exercise restraint in invoking the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act's statutory exceptions to the notice-and-
comment rulemaking procedures. Thus, the Administrative Conference
has consistently urged agencies voluntarily to use notice-and-comment
procedures when issuing rules that fall within the terms of most of the
exemptions under 5 U.S.C. § 553.9
2. For rules falling within the "procedure or practice" exception in 5
U.S.C. § 553(b)(A), agencies should use notice-and-comment proce-
dures voluntarily except in situations in which the costs of such proce-
dures will outweigh the benefits of having public input and information
on the scope and impact of the rules, and of the enhanced public ac-
ceptance of the rules that would derive from public comment.
3. In determining whether a proposed rule falls within the statutory
exception for rules of agency "procedure or practice," agencies should
apply the following standard: A rule is within the terms of the excep-
tion when it both (a) relates solely to agency methods of internal opera-
tions or of interacting with regulated parties or the public, and (b) does
not (i) significantly affect conduct, activity, or a substantive interest
that is the subject of agency jurisdiction, or (ii) affect the standards for
eligibility for a government program. 10
4. To assist agencies in implementing this recommendation, the Of-
fice of Management and Budget should refrain from exercising juris-
diction under Executive Order 12,291 with respect to rules relating to
an agency's procedure or practice that an agency voluntarily publishes
for notice and comment.
9. In some cases, the Conference has recommended that agencies generally use no-
tice and comment, Recommendation 76-5, "Interpretive Rules of General Applicability
and Statements of General Policy," 1 C.F.R. § 305.76-5 (1992); Recommendation 83-
2, "The 'Good Cause' Exemption from APA Rulemaking Requirements," 1 C.F.R. §
305.83-2 (1992). In the case of some other exemptions, the Conference has also recom-
mended eliminating them altogether. Recommendation 69-8, "Elimination of Certain
Exemptions from the APA Rulemaking Requirements," I C.F.R. § 305.69-8 (1992);
Recommendation 73-5, "Elimination of the 'Military or Foreign Affairs Function' Ex-
emption From APA Rulemaking Requirements," 1 C.F.R. § 305.73-5 (1992).
10. The term "program" is meant to be interpreted broadly to include, among
others, those involving benefits, contracts, licenses, permits, and loan guarantees. See
supra note 8.
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